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Abstract
Contigency is a definition for which is noted for not having the principle of contradiction in
itself, for which gives a different truths from what we are used to derive from geometry as an
essential field for knowledge of creating strong logics. Leibniz clearly states one of his ideas for
God, and why there must be contigent truths and necessary truths.
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1 The Argument
Contigency was first thought from Aristotle as
he states on Physics that there should be a first
principe for Universe to exists.
This is also noted as Cosmological Argument in
nowadays language. Aristotle was not the first
to question this, before and after him, this ques-
tion was always a problem of first reason, or first
principle. In natural theology, we have seen the
strong logics of Thomas Aquinas, his definitions
of omni-things. As he always wanted to explain
by his thesis that everything is strongly related
from cause, essence, becoming.
This argument for which we will explain later in
paragraphs comes in a form of proving that con-
tigent truths exists and is related to PSR - prin-
ciple of sufficient reason. In this article Leibniz
is trying to defend Parmenides inference that,
nothing comes from nothing, ex nihilo nihil fit.
2 Notions and logics
First in this article we see a strongly statement
of Leibniz that, God is a necessary being, as
for which one with a capacity of logics and
knowledge of metaphysics, one can say that, for
all ends to exists, there must be a metaphysical
premise. In one way telling that everything has
a beginning must have a metaphysical reason.
As for contigency, Creature are contigent,
meaning, their existence does not follow from
their essence. Necessary truths are those that
can be demonstrated through an analysis of
terms, so that in the end they become identities.
We can understand this logic clearly, that if
we take apart all problems of a problem, by
deduction, we would go to identities.
He clearly states that necessary truths depends
upon principle of contradiction, for which, there
would be no way we could reach identites.
Par contrary, contigent truths cannot be reduced
to this principle, because logically, all truths
would be necessary. There must be a common
language or notion between contigent existence
and of essential truths.
We must deeply think what is the reason
governing all, why we must have a metaphysical
principle to explain other physical principles.
A meaningful statement of Leibniz, that says,
every true affirmative proposition, either
necessary or contigent, has some connection
between subject and predicate. In identites this
connection is obvious and self-evident, in other
propositions it must appear through an analysis
of terms.
This can only be understood clearly for those
who studied geometry, as for necessity truths,
from axioms we would go to an identity equa-
tion that expresses the rigorosity of our train
of thought. Otherwise, if we do not go to this
equation, we will diverge, and ergo contigency
will arise.
Leibniz is trying to prove that we have to
start from a strong principle, for explaining all,
nothing exists without there being a greater
reason for it to exist than or it not to exist,
meaning, an incontestable, axiomatical truth.
In a way he is merging the religionist view of
omnisciencia with Aristotle’s thesis that there
is a first principle or are some ’first’ principles
for nature to exist.
Therefore, we must know truths of contigent
things a posteriori, meaning knowledge of thing
and their truths from experience. And by
dictating the PSR, one now can say that the
proposition that has the greater reason for
existing is necessary.
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As for Leibniz, a necessary truth to derive
all truths must be that, God always acts with
the hightest wisdom.
Then, definitions of necessary truths must rise
now. What is chosen from God does not mean
that is necessary, that he chose the best, or
that the best is necessary. Further, Leibniz
introduces these definitions, he explains the
distinction between necessity of the consequence
[necessitas consequentiae] and necessity of
consequent [necessitas consequentis]. God now
becomes the proposition that is a necessity of
consequence not of consequence. Since he is
saying this, he deduces that, only God must
or have the highest wisdom for which is the
primary reason for all to happen.
3 A simple proof
Proposition: The part is less than the
whole.
Leibniz defends this statement with identities.
By defining less as not as much as the other
thing, and defining much as a observable quan-
tity.
Proof: The part is equal to a part of the
whole, and what is equal to a part of a
whole is less than the whole, therefore the
part is less than the whole. In this method,
for which Leibniz is not the first deriving, Aris-
totle based upon this logic made syllogisms, a
deduction method base upon principle of identi-
ties.
Leibniz is trying to say by this simple proof, that
analysis of notions made in accordance of PSR is
a method to find primary truths, and then after
we can see that primary truths may or may not
be contigent or neccesary.
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